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Redesigning Combat
– from Divisions to Brigades
Colonel Teddy Bitner, US Army (Retired)
On an airplane
flight shortly after Desert Storm, I found myself seated next to a 20’s
something professional with a decidedly anti-military perspective. At
the time, the Administration (the first President Bush), Congress and
the media were talking about what to do with the "peace dividend" –
funds expected to be freed up by reducing the armed forces. The topic
of the peace dividend came up (after she found out that I was in the
Army) and my traveling companion asked, "Why in the world do we still
need a military. After all, we won the Cold War and we don’t have any
enemies anymore." I mumbled something about Communist China being a
long term threat, but really didn’t have an answer because, frankly,
I was also wondering about the future of the Army and what threats we
really faced.
An answer
wasn’t long in coming. The first World Trade Center bombing in February
1993 should have been a wakeup call. Although it got the attention of
law enforcement and counter-terrorist professionals, the event quickly
diminished in the memories of most Americans – including most of the
military. Meanwhile, the first Bush and Clinton Administrations were
busy reducing the overall Army force structure from 16 active divisions
to 10 and an overall active duty end strength from over 780,000 to 480,000,
a nearly 40% reduction, making the US Army the smallest it has been
since 1939. This was done at the same time overall troop deployments
increased 300% under President Clinton. (Cyrulik, Joseph and Kutter,
Wolf. "Army Endstrength and the National Security Strategy." In National
Security Watch, Institute of Land Warfare [8 July 1999]: 1.)
Background
As the
Army found itself a lot smaller and increasingly stretched by ad hoc
deployments (Haiti, Somalia) and long term commitments (Bosnia, Kosovo),
pressure to restructure in order to accommodate changing missions, conditions
and advancing technology mounted. Various ideas were considered within
Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), but a couple of books seemed
to make the case for a way out and a pattern for the future. These books
were War and Antiwar: Making Sense of Today’s Global Chaos, by
Alvin and Heidi Toffler (published in 1993) and Colonel Douglas Macgregor’s
Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st
Century, published in 1997. The Tofflers’ influence on
military thinking began with their book Third Wave in the 1980’s.
Macgregor was the Deputy Director of the Battle Command Battle Lab at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and well placed to impact future force design.
The Tofflers and Macgregor advocated moving the land force center of
gravity from the division to the brigade. Divisions had "combat central"
for the Army since World War I, and usually included 15,000 to 20,000
troops. Brigades were smaller organizations that were building blocks
within the division (three to five brigades), and made up 3,000 to 5,000
troops. The Tofflers, speaking from a theoretical perspective, held
that technological innovations could be used to make a brigade as potent
as a division by exponentially expanding their combat effectiveness.
Macgregor, arguing from a militarily practical point of view, indicated
that brigade sized units would have to be self-sufficient to operate
for long periods independently as part of joint (air, land and sea)
operations in the future. Macgregor recognized the importance of technological
innovation in expanding capabilities of brigades, but also advocated
that future brigade commanders would need to have all of the forces
necessary to accomplish his mission assigned to him on a permanent basis
(as opposed to be assigned to the division).
While
I was the senior NATO planner for Bosnia at Allied Forces Southern Europe
(AFSOUTH) in Naples, Italy from 1994-1996, I became aware of a European
reliance on brigade sized force structures (particularly Britain and
France), and often heard criticism from our allies about how large and
unwieldy American divisions (and their fighting vehicles and tanks)
were. Most other NATO nations involved in Bosnia could quickly deploy
their brigade sized units with nimble wheeled fighting vehicles. And
those vehicles were much friendlier to hard-topped Bosnian and Croatian
roads than American tracked vehicles. Leaders in the US Army began to
listen and consider whether brigade sized formations with wheeled fighting
vehicles weren’t better for future operations.
Then
came Task Force Hawk, the Army component sent to confront the Yugoslavs
in the 1999 Kosovo crisis. The US Army struggled to deploy forces in
a timely manner and received seriously negative press for their efforts.
Describing challenges faced by the Army during the Kosovo deployment,
Andrew Krepinevich, Jr. told Frontline,
The army
learned several lessons from Task Force Hawk. Perhaps the first one
was the political lesson. More and more people in Congress, even people
in the Pentagon, began to ask if the army was strategically relevant--can
the army get to one of these unpredictable trouble spots in a hurry?
To a certain extent, there's a political as well as a strategic need
for the army to address the Task Force Hawk problem. But again, that
is only a small part of the overall ability of the army to project power.
In the future, what the army is going to confront is not just the need
to move quickly to a distant trouble spot, but the ability to do it
in the absence of access to large forward fixed bases. And the reason
for this is that, increasingly, adversaries are going to take advantage
of this military revolution to acquire technology that enables them
to stare at these large fixed forward bases, say, from space. And with
the combination of the proliferation of ballistic and Cruise missiles,
they're going to target these bases. (Andrew Krepinevich, Jr, "Analysis
Task Force Hawk." In Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/future/experts/taskforce.html,
Accessed June 22, 2005.)
Pressured
by questions from politicians and other services (notably, the Air Force)
about the Army’s future relevance ("if they can’t get there – why should
we keep them?"), effects of downsizing numbers and units, increasing
deployments and aging equipment, the Army leadership struggled to meet
current mission requirements and plan for the future – reaching as far
out as the year 2020 to envision a future battlefield, technology and
enemies. Then Chief of Staff (CSA), Eric Shinseki focused the transformation
effort in 1999 on deployable, self-contained brigade sized units as
a partial answer to criticisms like Dr. Krepinevich’s.
In
addition to the Army’s deployability challenges and continuing to do
more with less, the Army had trouble successfully fielding new weapons
systems. The list of failed and cancelled systems is long and discomforting,
including the Sergeant York air defense system, the Crusader artillery
system, the Comanche helicopter, the M1 Grizzly Breacher, and the Armored
Gun System (AGS). The AGS is a case study in the Army being forced to
make political tradeoffs to preserve manpower.
When the
Army submitted its proposed fiscal 1997 budget, Defense Secretary William
Perry instructed the service to plan for an additional cut of 20,000
troops to pay for weapons modernization. Rather than accept a cut from
495,000 to 475,000 troops, Army leaders argued they could obtain the
necessary modernization funds through acquisition reforms and operating
efficiencies. The fiscal 1997 Defense budget request contained no further
Army troop cuts, but the Army cut the AGS program in an attempt to save
money for other modernization efforts. ("M8 Armored Gun System." GloabalSecurity.org.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m8-ags.htm.
Accessed 23 June 2005.)
These
cancellations came as the Army’s "big five" weapons systems (M-1 Abrams
Tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Black Hawk and Apache helicopters,
and the Patriot missile system) pushed through the procurement system
in the early 1970’s by then CSA General Creighton Abrams continue to
age. And ironically – even though the Armored Gun System was given up
to preserve the Army end strength at 495,000, by fiscal year 1999 the
end strength stood at 480,000. ("Fiscal Year 1999 Recruiting and Retention."
US Department of Defense News Release [October 5, 1999]. http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/1999/b10051999_bt462-99.html.
Accessed 23 June 2005) Further, it was during this time that even with
a reduced force structure, the Army struggled to maintain combat readiness,
admitting in November 1999 that only eight of the ten divisions were
ready for combat. ("US Army Rates Two Divisions Unfit for War." CNN
[November 11, 1999]. www.cnn.com/US/9911/10/military.unprepared,
Accessed 23 June, 2005) The political environment in which the Army
leadership operated inside the Pentagon became increasingly hostile
during the late 1990’s – and it showed in manpower reductions and bait
and switch tradeoff’s such as the AGS. Taken with all of the other challenges,
political hostility toward the Army was a force moving the Army toward
a visible change in direction – but what direction?
Description
of Current Efforts
Army
"transformation", begun before General Shinseki became the CSA in 1999,
but sharpened and focused by him, has continued more or less in the
same direction under the current CSA – General Peter J. Schoomaker.
The Army is in the process of establishing "modular brigades" as the
focus of combat power instead of divisions. These brigades are intended
to be self-contained organizations. In order to get away from using
conventional terms such as battalion, brigade, division or corps, the
Army invented a bewildering series of letter designations to describe
levels of combat application. Roughly, "Units of Action" (UA) represent
brigade level formations, while Units of Employment (UE) represent higher
level formations, such as division and corps.
Army Transformation
thus far has focused mostly on the maneuver Unit of Action. The UA is
roughly equivalent to today’s combat brigade, beafed up with slice elements
from the division. At the same time, the Army is developing the UEx,
roughly equivelent to today’s division, but with no "assigned" UAs,
or brigades. The UEx consists of a headquarters plus five support UAs
(Fires, RSTA [RSTA stands for Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target
Acquisition], Sustainment, Maneuver Enhancement and Aviation). The
UEy is the top echolon and fills a role somwhere between a traditional
corps and an Army Service Component Command. (Hicks, Janet A., "The
Regiment in Transformation". In Army Communicator [Summer 2004].
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PAA/is_2_29/ai_n6355410#continue,
Accessed 22 June 2005.)
The
modular concept, in a nutshell, is that a given regional combatant commander
could design a force based on available brigades for a specific mission.
Theoritically, brigades assigned to support a specific mission would
have an operational relationship with their higher headquarters (probably
a UEx, but not necessarily). Over the past decade and a half, tailored
brigades have conducted operations in Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia,
Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. (Bonin, Colonel John A.; Crisco,
Lieutenant Colonel Telford E., Jr. "The Modular Army." In Military
Review [March-April 2004]. 25.) To date, primary focus within the
Army has been on development of these brigades. At present, work on
commands above the brigade level remain relatively immature.
Presently,
the Army is on track for three types of brigades – light (with motorized
infantry); heavy (with armor) and airborne. The goal is to have 48 brigades
by 2007 and 8 to 12 UEx. "Each UEx will serve as a command and control
organization for up to six UA brigades, as opposed to the current three
brigades per division. Again, the decisions are pending, but the UEx
will likely retain divisional ‘designations;’ however, they may not
deploy as a division." (Tucker, Terry L. "Restructuring the Force" In
Armor [May-June 2004] www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PAB/is_3_113/ai_n6129830.
June 25, 2005.)
Concerns
about Brigade Focus
The
Army transformation process is much larger than a brigade focused force
structure. It embraces weapons systems, command and control technology
(integrated into fighting vehicles), integrating three levels of modernization
("legacy", "interim" and "objective") capabilities, and attempts to
train combat leaders to think in ways that exploits their new capabilities
and takes advantage of enemy weaknesses (although this is not new).
However, focus of concern in this paper is on the brigade as the central
building block for combat effectiveness.
Positive
aspects of brigade focus.
Perhaps
the strongest "selling point" for a brigade based combat force is its
self-contained nature. Theoretically, a UA will be self-sustaining with
all of the capabilities necessary to operate as a land based force (maneuver,
intelligence, engineer, artillery, air defense, supply and service).
This organization makes the brigade a complete deployable force somewhat
similar to a US Marine Corps expeditionary unit, and can be used as
a stand-alone land force for a short period of time in a contingency.
Concerns
about the brigade focus
Criticisms
of the Army’s transformation generally revolve around two issues. First
is the assertion that the US Army division has worked well in the past
and is sufficiently flexible to adapt to future conflicts. The second
criticism is that a particular vehicle selected for use by some brigades,
the "Stryker" is the wrong choice.
Division
versus brigade. Is this a force designed to fight
the last war or the next war? The answer to this question might not
be so obvious. Current transformation efforts stem directly from embarrassment
and criticism resulting from Task Force Hawk and political and inter-service
criticism in concert with hits that the Army was taking by the Pentagon
brass in the late 1990’s (force reduction and killed programs). This
environment led to searches for ways to make the Army relevant in 1999,
and hopefully in the future. Criticism included the view that the Army
lacked an "expeditionary" mindset" – the mental agility and physical
ability to deploy forces in short notice (apparently without regard
to the 82nd Airborne Division, which exists for that very purpose).
A brigade focused force had already been suggested (by the Tofflers,
Macgregor and others), but in the aftermath of Task Force Hawk, the
proposal found legs. So, was Task Force Hawk the "last war" that the
Army is creating a force to fight? Is there a reason to continue to
move toward a brigade centric force given our experiences in the war
on terror? Finally, is the current war a paradigm for the future, or
is it an anomaly?
Critics
point to the success and flexibility of the Army’s division force structure,
with support units assigned at division level and apportioned to brigades
based on the mission. Advocates of the brigade centric force say that
the division is too rigid, and that brigades need to be able to deploy
in a stand-alone mode. Although the transformation process will probably
keep a division-like higher headquarters, support capabilities will
all be moved to the brigade level. Ultimately, professionals on all
sides recognize the need for a division level command and control capability
to deal with large scale conventional operations. During Desert Storm,
the French essentially created a division structure (6th Light Armored
Division) to command assembled regimental formations – headquarters
they established "on the fly" for that contingency. (Scales, Brigadier
General Robert H. (ed), Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf
War. (Washington D.C.: US Army Office of the Chief of Staff, 1993).
139.) The US Army cannot afford to go to war with a command and control
headquarters pulled together at the last moment. The conventional phase
of the war in Iraq underscored the importance and effectiveness of a
modern division structure in war. The Army must pay attention to fully
developing the level above brigade and rigorously exercise the capability
before full employment. An alternative approach would be to create several
(four to six) highly capable maneuver brigades for expeditionary use,
with the remaining transformed brigades residing within streamlined
and more flexible division structures.
The
Stryker. The second major criticism of the current
transformation revolves around the Stryker armored personnel carrier.
The Stryker is being fielded in two basic variants – an infantry carrier
and a mobile gun system. The infantry carrier will carry nine infantry
soldiers with equipment, and is operated by a driver and commander.
The vehicle has a 350 horsepower diesel engine, eight wheels and is
capable of traveling up to 62 miles per hour. The infantry carrier is
armed with a .50 caliber machine gun or a Mark 19 automatic grenade
launcher. The mobile guns system is still under development, but is
supposed to mount a 105 millimeter turreted gun system. Vehicle weight
and armor will be discussed later.
The
Stryker has been at the center of controversy from the beginning (1999)
with critics claiming that is too lightly armored, that it really doesn’t
have effective cross country mobility, and that it can only be loaded
and flown in a C-130 aircraft under very restrictive conditions. After
a Stryker brigade was deployed to Iraq in 2003, the Center for Army
Lessons Learned prepared a report entitled Initial Impressions Report:
Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker Brigade Combat Team 1, 3rd Brigade,
2nd Infantry (21 December 2004). This report found that the Stryker,
even with "slat armor" added (slat armor is a "cage" of armor installed
on the vehicles about 18 inches from the augmenting ceramic armor installed
on top of the regular steel armor – that is three layers of armor –
two of which were after-market additions) had difficulty defeating some
RPG rounds. Additionally, slat armor increased the size of the vehicles
and caused some problems with safety and the additional weight caused
problems with the automatic tire inflation system (due to weight).
With
an average weight of 38,000 pounds, the Stryker is very near the upper
limit of transportability by a C-130, and cannot be transported with
7,000 pounds of armor added. The Army Test and Evaluation Command report
entitled "Stryker Findings" in August 2002 said that the ability for
the vehicle to fit in a C-130 aircraft was a problem. According to a
GAO report issued in 2004, even without the additional armor, the Stryker
could not be transported at higher elevations (such as Afghanistan)
in daytime in the summer. Further, if fitted with add-on armor, the
vehicle would be unable to fit within a C-130. These restrictions limit
transportability of the weapons system within theater as a combat configured
load. ("Military Transformation: Fielding of the Army’s Stryker Vehicles
is Well Under Way, but Expectations for Their Transportability by C-130
Aircraft Need to be Clarified." [Washington D.C., General Accounting
Office, August 2004], 4.)
During
development and early fielding of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the
M-1 Abrams tank – both combat systems were roundly criticized by members
of Congress and the press as being too expensive and combat ineffective
for a variety of reasons. These criticism continued virtually to the
eve of Desert Storm, where both systems performed well (by magnificently
trained crews). The difference between those vehicles and the Stryker
was that the Bradley and Abrams had time to work out issues prior to
use in combat. The Stryker was sent into combat well before some problems
could be fixed – or other problems even discovered. The fact that the
Stryker brigade deployed to Iraq in 2003 was a matter of necessity (force
structure limitations), but such an early deployment of an unproven
system (with known problems) did a disservice to the system and their
crews. Eventually, the Stryker may become a fine and effective combat
vehicle for immediate use in expeditionary operations – but independent
analysis and combat experience indicates that the vehicle, in its present
configuration, does have significant limitations that must be addressed
for the sake of mission accomplishment and crew safety.
Conclusion
The
current transformation effort was driven largely by political necessity
instead of combat reality. That is not to say that transformation to
exploit technological advances and flexibility to meet different contingencies
is not required – the Army should be constantly assessing and improving.
Many aspects of the brigade centric effort – not even touched in this
article – have yielded important insights into future warfare. This
is particularly true of experiments conducted over several years by
the Mounted Battle Space Battle Lab at Fort Knox. However, as this process
moves forward, the Army leadership must ensure the continuation of a
robust command and control structure above the brigade level. The era
of conventional warfare has been declared dead several times since World
War I. As for the Stryker, critics contend that there are better vehicles
available (including the venerable M113 series). Time will tell.
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