Redesigning Combat – from Divisions to Brigades

Colonel Teddy Bitner, US Army (Retired)

On an airplane flight shortly after Desert Storm, I found myself seated next to a 20’s something professional with a decidedly anti-military perspective. At the time, the Administration (the first President Bush), Congress and the media were talking about what to do with the "peace dividend" – funds expected to be freed up by reducing the armed forces. The topic of the peace dividend came up (after she found out that I was in the Army) and my traveling companion asked, "Why in the world do we still need a military. After all, we won the Cold War and we don’t have any enemies anymore." I mumbled something about Communist China being a long term threat, but really didn’t have an answer because, frankly, I was also wondering about the future of the Army and what threats we really faced.

An answer wasn’t long in coming. The first World Trade Center bombing in February 1993 should have been a wakeup call. Although it got the attention of law enforcement and counter-terrorist professionals, the event quickly diminished in the memories of most Americans – including most of the military. Meanwhile, the first Bush and Clinton Administrations were busy reducing the overall Army force structure from 16 active divisions to 10 and an overall active duty end strength from over 780,000 to 480,000, a nearly 40% reduction, making the US Army the smallest it has been since 1939. This was done at the same time overall troop deployments increased 300% under President Clinton. (Cyrulik, Joseph and Kutter, Wolf. "Army Endstrength and the National Security Strategy." In National Security Watch, Institute of Land Warfare [8 July 1999]: 1.)

 

Background

As the Army found itself a lot smaller and increasingly stretched by ad hoc deployments (Haiti, Somalia) and long term commitments (Bosnia, Kosovo), pressure to restructure in order to accommodate changing missions, conditions and advancing technology mounted. Various ideas were considered within Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), but a couple of books seemed to make the case for a way out and a pattern for the future. These books were War and Antiwar: Making Sense of Today’s Global Chaos, by Alvin and Heidi Toffler (published in 1993) and Colonel Douglas Macgregor’s Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century, published in 1997. The Tofflers’ influence on military thinking began with their book Third Wave in the 1980’s. Macgregor was the Deputy Director of the Battle Command Battle Lab at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and well placed to impact future force design. The Tofflers and Macgregor advocated moving the land force center of gravity from the division to the brigade. Divisions had "combat central" for the Army since World War I, and usually included 15,000 to 20,000 troops. Brigades were smaller organizations that were building blocks within the division (three to five brigades), and made up 3,000 to 5,000 troops. The Tofflers, speaking from a theoretical perspective, held that technological innovations could be used to make a brigade as potent as a division by exponentially expanding their combat effectiveness. Macgregor, arguing from a militarily practical point of view, indicated that brigade sized units would have to be self-sufficient to operate for long periods independently as part of joint (air, land and sea) operations in the future. Macgregor recognized the importance of technological innovation in expanding capabilities of brigades, but also advocated that future brigade commanders would need to have all of the forces necessary to accomplish his mission assigned to him on a permanent basis (as opposed to be assigned to the division).

While I was the senior NATO planner for Bosnia at Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples, Italy from 1994-1996, I became aware of a European reliance on brigade sized force structures (particularly Britain and France), and often heard criticism from our allies about how large and unwieldy American divisions (and their fighting vehicles and tanks) were. Most other NATO nations involved in Bosnia could quickly deploy their brigade sized units with nimble wheeled fighting vehicles. And those vehicles were much friendlier to hard-topped Bosnian and Croatian roads than American tracked vehicles. Leaders in the US Army began to listen and consider whether brigade sized formations with wheeled fighting vehicles weren’t better for future operations.

Then came Task Force Hawk, the Army component sent to confront the Yugoslavs in the 1999 Kosovo crisis. The US Army struggled to deploy forces in a timely manner and received seriously negative press for their efforts. Describing challenges faced by the Army during the Kosovo deployment, Andrew Krepinevich, Jr. told Frontline,

The army learned several lessons from Task Force Hawk. Perhaps the first one was the political lesson. More and more people in Congress, even people in the Pentagon, began to ask if the army was strategically relevant--can the army get to one of these unpredictable trouble spots in a hurry? To a certain extent, there's a political as well as a strategic need for the army to address the Task Force Hawk problem. But again, that is only a small part of the overall ability of the army to project power. In the future, what the army is going to confront is not just the need to move quickly to a distant trouble spot, but the ability to do it in the absence of access to large forward fixed bases. And the reason for this is that, increasingly, adversaries are going to take advantage of this military revolution to acquire technology that enables them to stare at these large fixed forward bases, say, from space. And with the combination of the proliferation of ballistic and Cruise missiles, they're going to target these bases. (Andrew Krepinevich, Jr, "Analysis Task Force Hawk." In Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/future/experts/taskforce.html, Accessed June 22, 2005.)

Pressured by questions from politicians and other services (notably, the Air Force) about the Army’s future relevance ("if they can’t get there – why should we keep them?"), effects of downsizing numbers and units, increasing deployments and aging equipment, the Army leadership struggled to meet current mission requirements and plan for the future – reaching as far out as the year 2020 to envision a future battlefield, technology and enemies. Then Chief of Staff (CSA), Eric Shinseki focused the transformation effort in 1999 on deployable, self-contained brigade sized units as a partial answer to criticisms like Dr. Krepinevich’s.

In addition to the Army’s deployability challenges and continuing to do more with less, the Army had trouble successfully fielding new weapons systems. The list of failed and cancelled systems is long and discomforting, including the Sergeant York air defense system, the Crusader artillery system, the Comanche helicopter, the M1 Grizzly Breacher, and the Armored Gun System (AGS). The AGS is a case study in the Army being forced to make political tradeoffs to preserve manpower.

When the Army submitted its proposed fiscal 1997 budget, Defense Secretary William Perry instructed the service to plan for an additional cut of 20,000 troops to pay for weapons modernization. Rather than accept a cut from 495,000 to 475,000 troops, Army leaders argued they could obtain the necessary modernization funds through acquisition reforms and operating efficiencies. The fiscal 1997 Defense budget request contained no further Army troop cuts, but the Army cut the AGS program in an attempt to save money for other modernization efforts. ("M8 Armored Gun System." GloabalSecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/m8-ags.htm. Accessed 23 June 2005.)

These cancellations came as the Army’s "big five" weapons systems (M-1 Abrams Tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Black Hawk and Apache helicopters, and the Patriot missile system) pushed through the procurement system in the early 1970’s by then CSA General Creighton Abrams continue to age. And ironically – even though the Armored Gun System was given up to preserve the Army end strength at 495,000, by fiscal year 1999 the end strength stood at 480,000. ("Fiscal Year 1999 Recruiting and Retention." US Department of Defense News Release [October 5, 1999]. http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/1999/b10051999_bt462-99.html. Accessed 23 June 2005) Further, it was during this time that even with a reduced force structure, the Army struggled to maintain combat readiness, admitting in November 1999 that only eight of the ten divisions were ready for combat. ("US Army Rates Two Divisions Unfit for War." CNN [November 11, 1999]. www.cnn.com/US/9911/10/military.unprepared, Accessed 23 June, 2005) The political environment in which the Army leadership operated inside the Pentagon became increasingly hostile during the late 1990’s – and it showed in manpower reductions and bait and switch tradeoff’s such as the AGS. Taken with all of the other challenges, political hostility toward the Army was a force moving the Army toward a visible change in direction – but what direction?

Description of Current Efforts

Army "transformation", begun before General Shinseki became the CSA in 1999, but sharpened and focused by him, has continued more or less in the same direction under the current CSA – General Peter J. Schoomaker. The Army is in the process of establishing "modular brigades" as the focus of combat power instead of divisions. These brigades are intended to be self-contained organizations. In order to get away from using conventional terms such as battalion, brigade, division or corps, the Army invented a bewildering series of letter designations to describe levels of combat application. Roughly, "Units of Action" (UA) represent brigade level formations, while Units of Employment (UE) represent higher level formations, such as division and corps.

Army Transformation thus far has focused mostly on the maneuver Unit of Action. The UA is roughly equivalent to today’s combat brigade, beafed up with slice elements from the division. At the same time, the Army is developing the UEx, roughly equivelent to today’s division, but with no "assigned" UAs, or brigades. The UEx consists of a headquarters plus five support UAs (Fires, RSTA [RSTA stands for Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition], Sustainment, Maneuver Enhancement and Aviation). The UEy is the top echolon and fills a role somwhere between a traditional corps and an Army Service Component Command. (Hicks, Janet A., "The Regiment in Transformation". In Army Communicator [Summer 2004]. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PAA/is_2_29/ai_n6355410#continue, Accessed 22 June 2005.)

The modular concept, in a nutshell, is that a given regional combatant commander could design a force based on available brigades for a specific mission. Theoritically, brigades assigned to support a specific mission would have an operational relationship with their higher headquarters (probably a UEx, but not necessarily). Over the past decade and a half, tailored brigades have conducted operations in Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. (Bonin, Colonel John A.; Crisco, Lieutenant Colonel Telford E., Jr. "The Modular Army." In Military Review [March-April 2004]. 25.) To date, primary focus within the Army has been on development of these brigades. At present, work on commands above the brigade level remain relatively immature.

Presently, the Army is on track for three types of brigades – light (with motorized infantry); heavy (with armor) and airborne. The goal is to have 48 brigades by 2007 and 8 to 12 UEx. "Each UEx will serve as a command and control organization for up to six UA brigades, as opposed to the current three brigades per division. Again, the decisions are pending, but the UEx will likely retain divisional ‘designations;’ however, they may not deploy as a division." (Tucker, Terry L. "Restructuring the Force" In Armor [May-June 2004] www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PAB/is_3_113/ai_n6129830. June 25, 2005.)

Concerns about Brigade Focus

The Army transformation process is much larger than a brigade focused force structure. It embraces weapons systems, command and control technology (integrated into fighting vehicles), integrating three levels of modernization ("legacy", "interim" and "objective") capabilities, and attempts to train combat leaders to think in ways that exploits their new capabilities and takes advantage of enemy weaknesses (although this is not new). However, focus of concern in this paper is on the brigade as the central building block for combat effectiveness.

Positive aspects of brigade focus.

Perhaps the strongest "selling point" for a brigade based combat force is its self-contained nature. Theoretically, a UA will be self-sustaining with all of the capabilities necessary to operate as a land based force (maneuver, intelligence, engineer, artillery, air defense, supply and service). This organization makes the brigade a complete deployable force somewhat similar to a US Marine Corps expeditionary unit, and can be used as a stand-alone land force for a short period of time in a contingency.

Concerns about the brigade focus

Criticisms of the Army’s transformation generally revolve around two issues. First is the assertion that the US Army division has worked well in the past and is sufficiently flexible to adapt to future conflicts. The second criticism is that a particular vehicle selected for use by some brigades, the "Stryker" is the wrong choice.

Division versus brigade. Is this a force designed to fight the last war or the next war? The answer to this question might not be so obvious. Current transformation efforts stem directly from embarrassment and criticism resulting from Task Force Hawk and political and inter-service criticism in concert with hits that the Army was taking by the Pentagon brass in the late 1990’s (force reduction and killed programs). This environment led to searches for ways to make the Army relevant in 1999, and hopefully in the future. Criticism included the view that the Army lacked an "expeditionary" mindset" – the mental agility and physical ability to deploy forces in short notice (apparently without regard to the 82nd Airborne Division, which exists for that very purpose). A brigade focused force had already been suggested (by the Tofflers, Macgregor and others), but in the aftermath of Task Force Hawk, the proposal found legs. So, was Task Force Hawk the "last war" that the Army is creating a force to fight? Is there a reason to continue to move toward a brigade centric force given our experiences in the war on terror? Finally, is the current war a paradigm for the future, or is it an anomaly?

Critics point to the success and flexibility of the Army’s division force structure, with support units assigned at division level and apportioned to brigades based on the mission. Advocates of the brigade centric force say that the division is too rigid, and that brigades need to be able to deploy in a stand-alone mode. Although the transformation process will probably keep a division-like higher headquarters, support capabilities will all be moved to the brigade level. Ultimately, professionals on all sides recognize the need for a division level command and control capability to deal with large scale conventional operations. During Desert Storm, the French essentially created a division structure (6th Light Armored Division) to command assembled regimental formations – headquarters they established "on the fly" for that contingency. (Scales, Brigadier General Robert H. (ed), Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War. (Washington D.C.: US Army Office of the Chief of Staff, 1993). 139.) The US Army cannot afford to go to war with a command and control headquarters pulled together at the last moment. The conventional phase of the war in Iraq underscored the importance and effectiveness of a modern division structure in war. The Army must pay attention to fully developing the level above brigade and rigorously exercise the capability before full employment. An alternative approach would be to create several (four to six) highly capable maneuver brigades for expeditionary use, with the remaining transformed brigades residing within streamlined and more flexible division structures.

The Stryker. The second major criticism of the current transformation revolves around the Stryker armored personnel carrier. The Stryker is being fielded in two basic variants – an infantry carrier and a mobile gun system. The infantry carrier will carry nine infantry soldiers with equipment, and is operated by a driver and commander. The vehicle has a 350 horsepower diesel engine, eight wheels and is capable of traveling up to 62 miles per hour. The infantry carrier is armed with a .50 caliber machine gun or a Mark 19 automatic grenade launcher. The mobile guns system is still under development, but is supposed to mount a 105 millimeter turreted gun system. Vehicle weight and armor will be discussed later.

The Stryker has been at the center of controversy from the beginning (1999) with critics claiming that is too lightly armored, that it really doesn’t have effective cross country mobility, and that it can only be loaded and flown in a C-130 aircraft under very restrictive conditions. After a Stryker brigade was deployed to Iraq in 2003, the Center for Army Lessons Learned prepared a report entitled Initial Impressions Report: Operations in Mosul, Iraq, Stryker Brigade Combat Team 1, 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry (21 December 2004). This report found that the Stryker, even with "slat armor" added (slat armor is a "cage" of armor installed on the vehicles about 18 inches from the augmenting ceramic armor installed on top of the regular steel armor – that is three layers of armor – two of which were after-market additions) had difficulty defeating some RPG rounds. Additionally, slat armor increased the size of the vehicles and caused some problems with safety and the additional weight caused problems with the automatic tire inflation system (due to weight).

With an average weight of 38,000 pounds, the Stryker is very near the upper limit of transportability by a C-130, and cannot be transported with 7,000 pounds of armor added. The Army Test and Evaluation Command report entitled "Stryker Findings" in August 2002 said that the ability for the vehicle to fit in a C-130 aircraft was a problem. According to a GAO report issued in 2004, even without the additional armor, the Stryker could not be transported at higher elevations (such as Afghanistan) in daytime in the summer. Further, if fitted with add-on armor, the vehicle would be unable to fit within a C-130. These restrictions limit transportability of the weapons system within theater as a combat configured load. ("Military Transformation: Fielding of the Army’s Stryker Vehicles is Well Under Way, but Expectations for Their Transportability by C-130 Aircraft Need to be Clarified." [Washington D.C., General Accounting Office, August 2004], 4.)

During development and early fielding of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the M-1 Abrams tank – both combat systems were roundly criticized by members of Congress and the press as being too expensive and combat ineffective for a variety of reasons. These criticism continued virtually to the eve of Desert Storm, where both systems performed well (by magnificently trained crews). The difference between those vehicles and the Stryker was that the Bradley and Abrams had time to work out issues prior to use in combat. The Stryker was sent into combat well before some problems could be fixed – or other problems even discovered. The fact that the Stryker brigade deployed to Iraq in 2003 was a matter of necessity (force structure limitations), but such an early deployment of an unproven system (with known problems) did a disservice to the system and their crews. Eventually, the Stryker may become a fine and effective combat vehicle for immediate use in expeditionary operations – but independent analysis and combat experience indicates that the vehicle, in its present configuration, does have significant limitations that must be addressed for the sake of mission accomplishment and crew safety.

Conclusion

The current transformation effort was driven largely by political necessity instead of combat reality. That is not to say that transformation to exploit technological advances and flexibility to meet different contingencies is not required – the Army should be constantly assessing and improving. Many aspects of the brigade centric effort – not even touched in this article – have yielded important insights into future warfare. This is particularly true of experiments conducted over several years by the Mounted Battle Space Battle Lab at Fort Knox. However, as this process moves forward, the Army leadership must ensure the continuation of a robust command and control structure above the brigade level. The era of conventional warfare has been declared dead several times since World War I. As for the Stryker, critics contend that there are better vehicles available (including the venerable M113 series). Time will tell.